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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines the effect of growth shocks in European countries on economic activity in Morocco and Tunisia. 2 Both Morocco and Tunisia have taken significant steps to open up their economies and signed association agreements with the European Union (EU) in the mid nineties. 3 In the past decade, these countries have attracted sizable inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI), liberalized trade and lowered the entry barriers for foreign banks into domestic financial markets. Today, they rely on Europe for a large share of their external receipts (exports, tourism receipts, workers' remittances and FDI), and growth is likely to be significantly influenced by events in their main European partners. Although the global crisis in 2008-09 did not cause a recession in Morocco or Tunisia, the recession in the EU had a clear impact on their external receipts.
In the context of increasing globalization, there has been a renewed interest in examining business cycle synchronization and spillovers of economic activity across countries. Recent studies have developed an approach to identify common shocks and spillovers. In line with these studies, we use structural vector autoregressions (SVARs) models to measure the response of Tunisian and Moroccan growth to an innovation in the growth rate of key partner countries. While simple contemporaneous correlations suggest strong business cycle comovement, SVARs have the additional advantage that they capture dynamic patterns present in the data and allow for a structural interpretation of impulse responses. Following Bayoumi and Swiston (2009) , we also use our baseline SVARs to gauge the contribution of different factors such as trade, revenues from tourism and remittances. A wide literature has suggested that these variables can be the source of important transmission channels of shocks across regions. 4 We find that positive shocks to a growth composite of trade partners have significant expansionary hump-shaped effects on growth in Morocco and Tunisia. Our analysis suggests noticeable differences in the transmission channels of these shocks in the two countries. For Tunisia, exports, and to a much lesser extent tourism, appear to be the major channels. Exports are also important in Morocco, but an equally important role is played by remittances and tourism. Our results are consistent with the evolution of the different macroeconomic aggregates in the wake of the 2008 recession in Europe. Moreover, an analysis by sector supports these results. In particular, re-estimating the VARs with sectoral data shows that the export-oriented sectors are the ones with significant responses to external growth shocks in Tunisia. In contrast, service-related sectors appear to be the most sensitive to external growth shocks in Morocco.
The paper is organized as follows. The first subsection of section II provides background information on the economic policy of both countries in the past decades and the role of the European Union as an export destination, and a source of tourism revenues, remittances and FDI. The second subsection describes the GDP data and looks at contemporaneous correlations between the different growth rates. In section III we estimate the spillovers using a SVAR analysis and we check the robustness of the results examining an alternative identification scheme for the structural shock. Section IV analyzes the role of different transmission channels, while in Section V we are redoing the SVAR analysis with sectoral data. Finally, Section VI identifies a number of policy issues in light of these results, while taking into account growth forecasts for Europe. Section VII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND DATA DESCRIPTION

A. Economic Policy and Links with Partner Countries
In the past decades Morocco and Tunisia have taken significant steps in opening up their economies. Aside from a similar geographical position, both countries are small open economies with important historical and cultural ties with Europe. Tunisia signed an association agreement with the European Union in 1995 and implemented it in 1998. Morocco signed an association agreement in 1996, which entered into force in 2000 (Box 1). Both agreements are part of a broader approach of the European Union (EU) towards widening its relations with neighboring countries from the south of the Mediterranean and aiming at the long-term objective of building a Euro-Mediterranean economic area. The implementation of the association agreements produced important changes for the two economies. Since then trade flows increased exponentially (Figure 1 ). Figure 1 . Total Imports and Exports (Millions of USD, 1990 -2008 Source: Country's authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Exports, tourism and remittances are sizable in both Morocco and Tunisia, although their importance varies between the two countries ( Figure 2 ). Relative to GDP, exports are substantially higher in Tunisia than in Morocco. In contrast, tourism and remittances appear to be more important in Morocco. For example, the ratio of remittances to GDP in Morocco is double the ratio in Tunisia. It provides increased financial support and favors enhanced regional cooperation for trade integration and the development of infrastructure (particularly for energy, transport, and information technology); improvements in the business climate (particularly through streamlined taxation and customs procedures, and strengthened intellectual and property rights); and a consolidated macroeconomic framework.
The EU is the main destination of exports for both Morocco and Tunisia ( Figure 3 ). The EU's average share in Moroccan exports for the period 2005-08 was 70 percent. For Tunisia this share is slightly higher, at 77 percent. The EU plays an even more prominent role when it comes to tourism and remittances. The average shares for tourism revenues and remittances originating from the EU during the same period are between 80 percent and 90 percent. Moreover, these shares appear to be relatively stable over time. Other channels might also be explored to examine the interrelation between the European Union and Morocco and Tunisia's economies, such as imports, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, as well as financial linkages. Regarding FDI, although these flows are generally volatile, Figure  4 suggests that they represent a potentially important transmission channel between the EU and the Moroccan and Tunisian economies. We consider however that the effect of FDI is mainly structural and manifests itself in the medium to long term. As such, it is less suited for an analysis centered on business cycles correlations. Foreign banks have non-negligible presences in the two countries' banking systems. Majorityowned foreign banks accounted for 21.4 percent of total banking assets in Morocco (2008) and for 29.4 percent in Tunisia (2009). This presence might play a role in terms of increased competition, improved banking practices and diversification of funding sources but, as in the case of imports and FDIs, these effects are more likely to appear in the long run. Nevertheless, the impact of the opening of the domestic market to foreign banks in Morocco and Tunisia is a subject that deserves a multiple-angled analysis which goes beyond the purpose of our paper. 
(b) Tunisia
Professional accounts in foreign currency may be opened by resident individuals, Tunisian legal entity and foreign legal entity in Tunisia with foreign currency assets in connection with its activities. Authorization by the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT) is required for residents to open accounts abroad. Export proceeds must be repatriated within a time limit from the payment due date. However, resident exporters may retain up to 100 percent of their foreign exchange export proceeds. The acquisition of assets (capital and money market instruments) abroad by residents is subject to authorization. Residents are also required to repatriate all income from investment abroad, as well as all proceeds from the divestiture or liquidation of such investments. Stocks in existing companies in Tunisia may be acquired freely with foreign exchange transferred from abroad by foreign nonresidents. However, the acquisition by foreigners of shares with voting rights is subject to the approval of the High Investment Commission. Nonresidents may also sell freely shares of companies established in Tunisia. They may also transfer freely net real proceeds from the sale of shares that were purchased with foreign exchange transferred from abroad.
Source: International Monetary Fund, 2009, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
B. Correlation of Growth Rates with European Partners
Growth rates of Morocco and Tunisia, on one hand, and their key European partners, on the other hand, appear strongly positively correlated in the last decade. In our econometric analysis, we use real nonagricultural year-on-year growth rates of GDP series for Morocco 
III. ESTIMATING THE SPILLOVERS
A. Identification Scheme
We proceed with a VAR-based identification scheme in order to estimate the impact of an innovation in EU growth on Morocco and Tunisia nonagricultural GDP growth. More specifically, for country j, the variables included in the baseline VAR are:
where c is a constant and t Z is the matrix with variables. The reduced-form residuals t u are This corresponds to the assumption that on impact structural shocks in Tunisia have a zero effect on shocks in European partner countries. It is important to note that changing the ordering of the variables in Z did not change our results.
B. Responses to External Growth Shock
For each country we use the longest available quarterly data for the VAR estimation. For Morocco, the sample covers the period 1990Q1 to 2009Q4, whereas for Tunisia the dataset is from 2000Q1 to 2009Q4. 9 Despite covering a relatively short time span, these datasets allow us to capture the recent period of high growth with important structural changes followed by the adverse shock of 2008-09. We include two lags in the estimated VARs. According to the Schwarz information criteria, this is the optimal lag length for both Morocco and Tunisia. Figure 5 shows impulse response function (IRFs) of growth in Morocco and Tunisia to a one standard deviation shock in the growth of GDP in the economic partners. The graph also includes standard error bands encompassing the 95 percent confidence interval. The impulse response of both Morocco and Tunisia GDP growth to EU GDP growth is significantly different from zero in the first four quarters. A variation of one percentage point in EU GDP growth produces a similar peak response in Morocco (0.59 in the second quarter) compared to Tunisia (0.62 in the third quarter) but generates a more abrupt and short lived response for Morocco, while the response is more persistent in the case of Tunisia.
As a robustness check, we also reversed the order of the growth rates in the VAR, and found similar results. As expected, in all the SVARs, growth shocks in Morocco and Tunisia generate nonsignificant responses on growth in the EU partner countries. The variance decompositions reported in Table 3 show how much of the forecast error variance of a country's GDP growth can be explained by the structural shocks to GDP growth in EU partner countries. The share explained by ( ) 10 Furthermore, forecast error variance decompositions show that the shocks in Morocco and Tunisia do not explain the shocks in EU partner countries. Source: IMF staff estimates.
C. Alternative Identification of Shocks
We analyze the robustness of the earlier results by considering a long-run identification scheme for the structural shocks in EU partner countries. Specifically, rather than identifying the structural shock in EU partner countries by imposing a zero response on impact, we identify this shock by assuming that growth in Morocco or Tunisia has no long-run impact on GDP in partner countries. This assumption can be motivated by the size of Morocco or Tunisia's economy compared to that of partner countries. Following Blanchard and Quah (1989) , the variables included in the baseline VAR are ordered as before:
The long-run effects of the structural shocks are given by: Figure 6 shows that the IRFs to structural shocks in EU partner countries identified using this long-run restriction scheme resemble the shocks identified in the short-run identification scheme. We also added IRFs to a one standard deviation shock of the reduced-form residual, so without making any identifying restriction on the correlation matrix of the residuals t u . The figure suggests that both the short-run and long-run restrictions do not impose big transformations. 
IV. DECOMPOSING THE SPILLOVERS BY TRANSMISSION CHANNELS
To get a sense of the relative importance of different transmission channels we follow the approach proposed in Bayoumi and Swiston (2009) . The SVARs are augmented one at a time with data on trade, tourism and remittances as exogenous variables. The potential contribution k c of a particular channel k is then calculated as: .
The contribution k c is the difference between the responses of growth in Morocco or Tunisia to growth in partner countries (r) minus the response of growth when the spillover is included as an exogenous variable ( k r ). The idea is that adding the exogenous variable to the VAR leaves in k r the part of the response that is not associated with the transmission channel k (Figure 7 ). This approach does not exclude the existence of other relevant transmission channels and does not account for the collinearity between the different channels. This also implies that the sources of spillovers k c are not necessarily required to sum up to the impulse response r. As such, we We also include the cumulative impulse response function of the SVARs estimated in Section III.B. The analysis suggests that, in the case of Tunisia, exports, and to a much lesser extent tourism, are the major transmission channels. Remittances seem to play a very limited role at these frequencies. For Morocco, the results show that besides exports, which still play an important role, remittances and tourism are also major transmissions channels for spillovers. Cross-correlations between the three flows are significant in the case of Morocco.
These results are in line with the actual evolutions in exports, tourism and remittances observed during the recent slowdown in Europe (Figure 9 ). In Morocco all the three variables strongly responded to the sharp drop in EU GDP.
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In Tunisia, on the other hand, exports were the most affected. Tourism receipts in Tunisia were less affected, while remittances showed a remarkably strong resilience. 11 For more details on this approach, see Bayoumi and Swiston (2009) . 
V. SECTORAL ANALYSIS
In this section we test the robustness of the previous results by examining the response of growth in different sectors to growth shocks in EU partner countries. To this aim, we re-run the SVAR and replace the nonagricultural GDP growth rates for Tunisia and Morocco with the GDP growth rates , j SECTOR t g in particular sectors. As in Section III B, the impulse response measures the reaction of these sectors' value added growth rate to the country-specific EU GDP composite. For country j, the variables included in the VAR are then:
.
In line with the results presented in Section IV, Figure 10 shows that in Morocco service-related sectors, which are more significantly influenced by tourism and transfers, appear to be more sensitive to the European cycle. Sectors such as manufacturing, construction, mining and energy do not seem to be significantly influenced. By contrast, in Tunisia export-oriented sectors, such as manufacturing and energy, are the most responsive. Agriculture, mining and other services show weak reactions to the variations in EU GDP. 
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The econometric analysis demonstrates that, for both Tunisia and Morocco's economies, the European Union plays a key role. Our analysis confirms the robustness of this connection and examines relative importance of its different transmission channels. While these close ties with the European Union have been a central factor contributing to the process of opening up the two economies and improving their competitiveness, they might also represent a challenge for the future.
Real output dropped by more than 4 percent in the Euro Area in 2009. Moreover, current forecasts are that the rebound in the EU area will be modest and slow. Growth in both domestic demand and real GDP will stay below their pre-crisis levels in the years to come (Figure 11) . Recent concerns about sovereign debt and the sustainability of public finances in Southern European countries add further downside risks to this outlook. Not only will real GDP growth in Europe be lower, but the engines of growth in Europe are expected to change, with less contribution coming from the domestic demand. As a result, growth in European imports-which represents the main source of external demand for Morocco and Tunisia-is projected to be less than half compared to the pre-crisis period in 2010 and 2011 ( Figure 11 ).
It is noteworthy that following the association agreements the market shares of Morocco and Tunisia in EU merchandise imports have not increased since 1999. Table 4 shows that these market shares have remained fairly stable or slightly decreased over the past decade. Several factors can explain this evolution, such as the increased liberalization of world trade under the WTO agreements and the fierce competition from fast-growing exporters such as China and Eastern Europe. Against this backdrop, maintaining market share is more than honorable. Morocco and Tunisia have weathered the recent slowdown in Europe well, due to relatively insulated financial systems, an exceptional agricultural production and strong domestic demand in 2009. In fact, growth accounting exercises suggests that domestic demand has become a more dynamic source of growth in both countries from 2008 onwards. However, increasing competitiveness and a further diversification of trade flows represent key challenges to sustain growth in the future. Figure 12 shows the shares of the EU and Maghreb in exports, imports and the destinationspecific cover ratio (exports to over imports from a region). The figure shows that trade with other Maghreb countries is marginal for both Morocco and Tunisia, and represents an unexploited potential, especially in the context of the more subdued growth projections for the European market. 
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that for both Morocco and Tunisia nonagricultural GDP growth rates are significantly influenced by the variations in GDP of their main European partners. However, the transmission channels appear to be different between the two countries. In the case of Tunisia, growth shocks are mainly transmitted through exports and, to a much lesser extent, tourism. Exports, tourism receipts and remittances play equally important roles in Morocco. These results are confirmed by the evolution of export, tourism, and remittances in the wake of the recent While our findings show a remarkable coherence, there are a number of limitations to keep in mind when interpreting these results. First, it should be emphasized that a VAR analysis is not a growth accounting exercise. It shows the sensitivity of the dependent variable to external shocks rather than the influence of different components on growth. Moreover, the results of the breakdown by transmission channel are only tentative. Other potentially important channels, such as FDI, imports and financial sector linkages, which have structural impacts on the economy in the long run, certainly warrant further study.
Our analysis confirms the important role played by the European Union for the Moroccan and Tunisian economies. We note, however, that this close tie might also represent a challenge for the future. For the two countries, enhancing competitiveness and diversifying trade flows is essential for sustaining future growth.
